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ANNOUNCEMENT
THE REVIEW takes pleasure in announcing the election to the
Editorial Board of the following members of the Second Year Class:
William B. Arnold, Robert Brigham, Edward H. Bryant, Jr., Samuel
Finestone, B. Graeme Frazier, Jr., Albert Maurice Hoyt, Jr.,
Joseph Gray Jackson, William F. Kennedy, E. Scott Lower, Jr.,
Joseph Matusow, John W. Murphy, Milton M. Propper, Ernest
Scott, Kendall H. Shoyer and Charles A. Wallace.

NOTES
THE REQUISITE MEDium IN A TENDER OF PERFORMANCE OF AN
OBLIGATION TO PAY MoNEY-It is notorious that legal tender:' forms

only a small part of the currency 2 that it is customarily used in business today in discharging monetary obligations. This medium of
payment is essentially impractical in making payments for large sums,
or at great distances, or after banking hours, because of its relative
scarcity, its bulk, and its attribute of passing from hand to hand
without endorsement and conferring on any bona fide purchaser for
value an indefeasible title.2 Yet, in the absence of a specification in
the contract of the medium of payment, it is settled law that monetary
obligations, if the obligee so insists, can be performed only by the
payment of what Congress has prescribed as legal tender, and the4
tender of anything else is insufficient to put the other party in default.
'See note, What money is legal tender, 31 A. L. R. 246 (I92); 3 WnsCONTRACTS (1920) § 1813. For the definition of legal tender according to
the English law, see BENJAMIN, SALE (6th ed. 1920) 884.
' Currency is used in this note to mean whatever circulates conventionally
on its own credit as a medium of exchange, and therefore includes bank notes,
government securities, certificates of deposit and certified checks. Pilmer v.Branch of State Bank, i6 Iowa 321, 329 (1864) ; Griswold v. Hepburn, 63 Ky.
TON,

It excludes the idea of depreciated money. Swift v. Whitney,
20, 33 (1865).
20 Ill. 144, 146 (1858). Money will be used as a generic term including legal

tender and other currency. 2 BouviER, LAw DICTIONARY (1914) 2238, 18 R. C.
L. 1266.
I See McMahon v. Sloan, 12 Pa. 229, 232 (1849), and cases there cited.
'Vick v. Howard, 136 Va. IO, 116 S. E. 465 (1923). And see Juliard v.
Greenman, 11o U. S. 421 (1883); Pearlstein v. Novitch, 239 Mass. 228, 131
N. E. 853 (I921). There are several other well-established rules of law which
mitigate the strictness of this rule, under special circumstances. If the parties
in their contract specifi some other medium than legal tender, then of course
legal tender cannot be insisted on. See the cases above. Other currency constitutes a good tender, unless specifically objected to as not being legal tender,
and an acceptance of any currency constitutes a complete discharge, provided it
(433)
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The strict traditional view on this point is well voiced, in an early
Pennsylvania case, 5 by Justice Gibson:
"However unconscionable, the motive may be,

[a party]

might openly reply, 'I only exercise a right I reserved by the contract, and although your notes could answer my ends as well as
specie, yet for the purpose of defeating the contract altogether, I
require payment in coin [legal tender], because I know you cannot procure it.' "

The difficulty with this rule of law, that where a contract provides for
a payment of so many dollars the payee reserves the right to insist on
legal tender, is that it no longer coincides with the real intention of
the parties in most contracts made in the modern business world.

What the parties actually intend by payment, is the turning over of a
certain amount of currency, the recognized equivalent of a certain

value expressed in terms of legal tender, as a standard. 6

The harshness of this doctrine has been somewhat alleviated by
the development in several jurisdictions of an apparently anomalous
rule that, where the person making payment has good reason to believe
that the legal medium will not be insisted on, if the payee objects on
that ground, the other party must be given a reasonable opportunity
7
This rule is applied where there has not been
to acquire legal tender.
a technical waiver, and where the obligor's belief does not rest on facts
that would constitute a basis for an estoppel. Of course in either of

the latter cases there would be no need of an opportunity to present
legal tender, and therefore no occasion to invoke the rule.

It is essen-

tially an equitable treatment of the problem,8 but it has been applied
is as represented. Corbit v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Har. 235 (Del. 1837) ; Ware v.
Street, 2 Head 6o (Tenn. 1859). Cf. City of San Juan v. St. John's Gas Co.,
195 U. S. 5Io (19o4). As to whether the acceptance of negotiable instruments
constitutes a complete discharge, where they are not eventually paid, see note,
It is generally held
IO L. R. A. (N. s.) 51o, especially 526 et seq. (19o7).
that a refusal of tender on any other ground, waives the right to object on the
ground that it is not legal tender. Polglass v. Oliver, 2 C. & J. 15 (Eng. 1831) ;
Beatty v. Miller, 47 Ind. App. 494, 94 N. E. 897 (1911); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 743, 3 ibid. § 18ig. And of course it is general contract law
that if the obligee waives performance, or prevents it, or is guilty of an anticipatory breach, tender is not necessary. 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. § 676. In regard
to prevention by the defendant of a presentation of legal tender by the plaintiff,
see especially Servel v. Jamieson, 255 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
'Decamp v. Feay, 5 Serg. & R. 323 (Pa. 1819).
'Of course the payee reserves the right to object to depreciated money.
See note 2, supra. But in the modern business world which has so many stabilized kinds of money beside legal tender, it is submitted that the parties in
using the term "payment" do not contemplate that the payee reserves the right
to object to a tender on the technical grounds that it is not legal tender.
'On this whole subject see ii A. L. R. 811 (1920) ; 23 A. L. R. 63o
(1922).

'The only grounds for the doctrine advanced by the cases are fairness,
the desire to avoid a harsh decision, or the necessity of preventing a "sharp
business trick."

NOTES
in law actions for damages ' as well as in suits in equity for specific
It has been applied almost exclusively where the
performance.'
plaintiff's belief is based on the defendant's acts or failure to act, but
there are at least dicta that it may be applied where the plaintiff's
Its application has been pracbelief is founded on business custom."
tically confined to cases in which time is not of the essence of the contract.' 2 Apparently the first expression of this doctrine was in an
early New Jersey equity case, 1 3 an action for specific performance of
a contract for the sale of land, brought by the vendee. The plaintiff
testified that the defendant had said that he would not insist on legal
tender, but this was denied by the defendant. The chancellor found
that at least the defendant had given the plaintiff some basis for
believing that he need not tender legal money, and that if he subsequently did insist on it, he would have to allow a reasonable time
after the date set for payment in order to procure it. In evaluating
this decision, it must be borne in mind that equity is not inclined to
construe time as being of the essence of a contract, especially where
it is not so specified, and also that if the plaintiff's evidence was
believed, there had been a waiver of strict performance by the defendant, or, at any rate, a basis for a plea of estoppel.1 4 A recent Arkansas
'
242
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Bass v. White, 65 N. Y. 565 (1875); Farris v. Ferguson, 146 Tenn. 498,
And see Compton v. Weber, 296 Ill. 412, 129 N. E.
(1922).

S. W. 873
(192).

"Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. S. 68 (I89O) ; Skinner v. Stone, 144 Ark. 353,
222 S. W. 36o (192o); Pickle v. Auble, 4 N. J. Eq. 315 (843).
'In Blablock v. Clark, 137 N. C. 140, 49 S. E. 88 (19o4), it was held that
where it was the custom of a particular business to make payments in some
other medium than legal tender, if the obligor is present at the appointed place
with the proper amount of the customary currency, and the other party does not
appear, the first party can be said to have been "ready, willing and able" to
perform his obligation. Whether, if the defendant had been present and objected to this medium, the plaintiff would have been entitled to an extension of
time, is a somewhat different question. See Stein v. Schapiro, 145 Minn. 6o,
,76 N. W. 54 (i92o), annotated in 8 A. L. R. 1268 (1920), in which the court
said that neither the custom of the parties nor of the business could force the
obligee to accept anything but legal tender, though "it -inght well be" that the
course of dealing or custom might have given the plaintiff a reasonable time to
produce and tender legal money. Cf. Hughes v. Knott, 138 N. C. IO5, 50 S. E.
586 (19o5).
' Cf. Cheney v. Libby, supra note 1O, and Compton v. Weber, supra note 9.
"Pickle v. Auble, supra note 1o.
" An early decision, Bass v. White, supra note 9, was apparently the next
case to take up the point. This was an action for damages for breach of contract. On the date set for payment the defendant obligee requested a check
and did not mention legal tender, but the plaintiff protested the amount demanded. Finally the plaintiff agreed to the amount set by the defendant, but
the latter suddenly refused a check and insisted on legal tender, which the plaintiff could not then procure as it was after banking hours. The defendant refused an offer of legal tender on the next business day. The court said that as
it was the custom of business men in New York City to make payments by
check, if a check was refused after business hours, the plaintiff should have
been allowed until the next busirless day to tender specie. Unfortunately the
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case 15 affords a very clear instance of the application of the rule.
The plaintiff, who was suing for specific performance of a contract
to convey land, had originally offered to buy certain timber on the
defendant's land. The defendant refused this proposition, but offered
to sell the land with the timber to the plaintiff. The latter wrote
accepting the offer unconditionally, and suggesting that if the other
would forward the deed together with a draft for the purchase price,
he would pay the draft. The defendant, finding that he had not
made a very good bargain, without prior notice insisted on legal tender. The court held'that under such circumstances he was obligated
to allow a reasonable time to procure this medium. A recent Tennessee case 18 reduces to a minimum the acts of the payee which will
justify the other party in claiming an extension of time in which to
secure legal tender. In that case the plaintiff was to pay $25 down,
and $16oo the next day on delivery. In affirming a lower court
decision in favor of the plaintiff, the court said:
"The defendant had taken a check the previous day without
question, and had paid [a certain] difference in money. The
plaintiffs had every reason to believe that the defendant would
take the checks [in payment of the rest] and the evidence shows
that he would have done so but for the fact that he was seeking
to avoid his contract. The checks of course were not legal
tender, and the fact that the defendant accepted a check the previous day was not such an act as would compel him to accept the
check tendered, but he should have given the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to procure money and tender it." 17
Such being the tenor of the decided cases in this matter, the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 18 bearing
on this point cannot fail to have an important effect on the future
development of this phase of the law of tender. The action, in this
case, was for damages for breach of contract. The defendant had
agreed to sell a pickle factory, its equipment, and the goodwill of the
business, and the plaintiff had agreed to pay $500 on the signing of
the agreement, a check for which was acknowledged in the agreement,
and on the date set for conveyance he was to pay $250o and to give
his note for the balance. The defendant had also agreed to transfer
the stock of pickles then on hand, at a specified rate, for which amount
case is not fully reported, and though the court does speak of business custom
as a basis for an extension of time, the decision could equally well have been
rested on waiver or apparent waiver. These two early cases are introduced to
show how the anomalous doctrine that is being discussed, apparently first was
announced in cases that might have been as well decided on other grounds.
Skinner v. Stone, supra note IO.
16

Farris v. Ferguson, supra note 9.
Compare the opinion of Holmes, J., quoted ifra p. 437.
Simmons v. Swan, 48 Sup. Ct. 52 (1927).

NOTES

the plaintiff agreed to give his note payable on demand, and secured
by a mortgage on the premises. Time was specified to be of the
essence of the contract. The defendant accepted a check for the $500
payment. The plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that on the day
set for conveyance, he went to the appointed place, but could not determine the defendant's whereabouts until two o'clock in the afternoon,
when the latter telephoned that he would not arrive until three o'clock
(the closing hour of the banks), and as a matter of fact he did not
arrive until five o'clock. An hour or so later, when all the papers
were ready, the plaintiff tendered a certificate of deposit for the $2560.
The defendant, apparently wishing to evade his contract, insisted on
legal tender, saying of the certificate of deposit, "Well, if I haven't
got to take it I am not going to take it; and I will simply say goodnight, gentlemen." He then walked out. The district court directed
a verdict for the defendant, which was affirmed in the circuit court of
appeals,' 9 one judge dissenting. The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment and held that the district court erred in directing a verdict
in this case. Mr. Justice Holmes said in giving the opinion of the
court:
"It will be noted that the contract contemplated that the first
payment should be by check, and the defendant had sent the
plaintiff a letter

.

.

. asking for a 'check in full for the pickle

stock' for which by the agreement he was to receive a note; the
amount as it turned out being nearly fifteen thousand dollars. In
such circumstances and in view of the way business is done at
the present day, it might be found to have been natural and reasonable to suppose that a certificate of deposit from a well-known
solvent bank in the neighborhood would be enough. It seems
likely that it would have been except for the defendant's desire
to escape from his contract. If without previous notice he
insisted upon currency that was strictly legal tender instead of
what usually passes as money, we think that at least the plaintiff
was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to get legal tender notes,
and as it was too late to get them that day might have tendered
them on the next. But the jury might find also that the defendant's behavior signified a refusal to go farther with the matter
and therefore the plaintiff was not called upon to do anything
more."
In reversing a directed verdict, the court is deciding that there
were "facts in evidence which if unanswered would justify men of
ordinary reason and firmness in affirming" the various points which
the plaintiff is bound to maintain.20 In this case, the question before
"ii F.(2d) 267 (C. C. A. ist, 1926), commented upon in (1926) 26 CoL.
L. REv. io4o.
"5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2494, quoting Brett, J., in Bridges
v. Ry. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 213 (1874). The federal cases give the court, if any-
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the court 21 was whether there was such evidence (a) that the plaintiff
tendered performance in accordance with the terms of the contract,
or (b) that the defendant waived strict performance, or prevented it
or was guilty of an anticipatory breach, or (c) that the plaintiff had
reason to believe that strict performance was not necessary 22 and
therefore should have been granted an extension of time in which to
acquire legal tender and that an anticipatory breach removed the
necessity of such further tender. The court decided that "at least"
there was satisfactory evidence as to (c).
Considering the evidence as to the first of these two points, and
omitting business custom which the court judicially notices, it is submitted that though relevant it is not of sufficient weight to justify a
positive finding. The acceptance of a single check for the payment
of earnest money is hardly the basis for a belief that the obligee will
waive his right to legal tender as to the payment of a much larger sum
to be paid on conveyance of the property. Certainly no other case
has gone that far.2 3 The expression of a willingness to accept a check
instead of a note payable on demand seems of even less weight. The
effect of the decision seems to be to raise a presumption of fact 24 in
favor of finding the obligor's belief that legal tender would not be
required to have been reasonably founded. Considering present busithing, an even greater power to direct a verdict, and if the court would have to
set aside a verdict found by the jury, it may direct a verdict for the other party.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Farmers' Co-op. Union, 2 F.(2d) 215
(1924) ; Commissioners of Marion Co. v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278, 284 (1876);
Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U. S. 116 (1874).
See 2 W=UuSTON, CONTRACrS (1920) § 676.
'This doctrine had been announced at least once before in the federal
courts, in Cheney v. Libby, supra note IO. However, that case was a suit in
equity in which there was an abundance of evidence of prevention, if not of
fraud. In considering the principal case in the circuit court of appeals, Cheney
v. Libby was not mentioned even by the dissenting judge.
' Farris v. Ferguson, supra note 9, is the only case that approaches the
principal case, in finding a reasonable basis for the belief that legal tender will
not be required, on such slight evidence. In that case, the parties to the contract
were farmers of long acquaintance, living in the same small town. The obligee
accepted a check for the purchase money and even returned a certain excess in
cash. The next day, without notice, he insisted on legal tender. It is submitted that the obligor in that case had more reason to be misled into thinking
that the legal medium would not be insisted on, than the plaintiff in Simmons v.
Swan. Furthermore the court in its decision emphasized the fact that time
was not of the essence of the contract, which is another respect in which that
case differed from the instant case. Cheney v. Libby, supra note IO, is a much
more conservative statement of the rule. The opinion asserts that the receipt
of payments by check at various times over a period of four years would
naturally induce the obligor to believe that legal tender would not be insisted
upon, and would justify his asking for an extension of time in which to acquire
it. See also Pershing v. Feinberg, 203 Pa. 144, 52 Atl. 22 (1902).
' The term presumption is a troublesome one. It is here used to mean that
"the court permits the jury to take for granted the existence of facts presumed
upon data which lack that probative value usually required to justify such a
finding." Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof, (192o)

68 U.

OF PA. L. REv. 307, 312.
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ness custom, it gives to the slightest evidence on this point a weight
that it does not possess strictly. On this basis, the strict rule as to
the obligee's right to insist on legal tender is relaxed, by giving the
obligor a reasonable extension of time in which to procure and tender
the necessary medium of payment. 25 Though this decision turns on a
point of evidence, the case apparently represents, in its necessary
effect, the most advanced statement of the doctrine involved. 26 It presents some solution to the practical problem of legal tender, and, from
the point of view of policy, it does not limit the Supreme Court to
what Judge Anderson, the dissenting judge in the circuit court of appeals, calls 27 "a rule of law entirely inconsistent with modern business practises."
W.F.K.
DiviSION OF PROPERTY ACCUMULATED DURING MARRIAGE VOID
AB INITIO-Suppose that a woman lives with a man in the bona fide

belief that she is lawfully married to him. By her labor, or otherwise,
she assists the supposed husband in the accumulation of property. In
fact, the marriage is absolutely void, as distinguished from merely
voidable. Is the woman, upon discovering the illegality of the relationship, entitled, either in law or in equity, to have a share of the
property so accumulated? The term "putative marriage" is given to
the relation described in the statement of the question. It is a marriage which is contracted in good faith by one or both of the parties,
but which is, notwithstanding, invalid on account of some impediment.
The term characterizes a marriage void from the beginning, as distinguished from a marriage which can be annulled by judicial decree.'
It is generally accepted that, at the common law, no rights as wife
can be acquired under a void marriage. 2 Therefore, the woman can-4
not claim dower in the man's property, and is not entitled to alimony.
2 It is submitted that the court's decision, that there was sufficient evidence
of an anticipatory breach to go to the jury, might be seriously questioned. The
implication of the defendant's words and acts was that he would accept legal
tender, but nothing else, because he did not have to. See 3 WILLISTON, op. Cit.
supra note I, § 1324. However, it is not useful to pursue this inquiry under a
discussion that is chiefly interested in the requisite of legal tender.
' The doctrine appears never to have been applied before in an action at
law for damages, involving a contract in which time was specified to be of the
essence. It also proceeds, on slighter evidence than any other case, to submit the
issue, to quote Anderson, J., dissenting in the circuit court of appeals, "to the
conscience and intelligence of the jury." See note 23, supra.
7 I1

F.(2d) -at 269.

13 R. C. L. 993, and ii A. L. R. 1194 (921).
Carpenter v. Smith, 24 Iowa 200 (1868) ; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2 Dana 1O2
(Ky. 1834) ; Price v. Price, 124 N. Y. 589, 27 N. E. 383 (i891).
'Barfield v. Barfield, 139 Ala. 290, 35 So. 884 (904) ; Cropsey v. Ogden,
n N. Y. 228 (1854) ; Smith v. Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (855).
App. 612 (2916) ; Lopp v. Lopp, 43 Mich. 287,
'Hazard v. Hazard, 197 Ill.
5 N. W. 317 (i88o); Collins v. Collins, 8o N. Y. I (188o).
'See
2
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This being the rule, the question then is: Has the putative wife any
other rights in the property acquired during the period of cohabitation? The recent case of Fung Dai Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong '
answers this in the negative.
Opposed to the holding of the Ah Leong case are decisions in
California, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington.6
Because of the seeming justice of the affirmative view of the question,
it becomes important to ascertain whether the decision in the Ah
Leong case is supportable. For the purposes of discussion, the jurisdictions in which the courts grant relief must be divided into two
classes, to wit, those where community property statutes prevail, which

embrace California, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington; and those
which have no such statutes, into which category fall Kansas and
Oklahoma.7 It will be remembered also that all of these states, except
Louisiana, are governed by the common law, except as modified by
statute, as is Hawaii.8
The question presented to the Hawaiian Supreme Court seems to
have arisen first in the United States in the cases of Smith v. Smith,'
a Texas decision, and in the Louisiana case of Patton v. Philadel0
phia."
In each, an equitable division of the property was decreed in
favor of the putative wife, but the courts were there dealing with the
rights acquired by the putative wife under the Spanish and Mexican
law, which existed in those jurisdictions at the time the marriages
were contracted, and the holdings were put expressly on that ground.
Louisiana has followed the doctrine of the Spanish law consistently,
but only because the principles of that body of law in regard to putative marriages were specifically made a part of the Louisiana Code."
Nevertheless, some reliance is made on Louisiana cases by the supporters of the conclusions there reached.
'Supreme Court of Hawaii, No. 1729, decided May 6, 1927.
'Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 Pac. 533 (1920); Werner v.
Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127 (x898); McCaffrey v. Benson, 4o La. Ann.
10, 3 So. 393 (1888) ; Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 3o, 19o Pac. io88 (1920) ;
Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 15o, 87 S. W. 1147 (905);
Wash. 110, 176 Pac. 22 (1918).
, See 31 C. J. 12, § 1074.
'HAw. REv. LAws (1925)

§ I.

Knoll v. Knoll, lO4

9I Tex. 621 (r846).
Ii La. Ann. 98 (1846).
'In McCaffrey v. Benson, supra note 6, at 15, the Louisiana court said,
in part: "But as Article 117 of our Code has been taken literally from Article
201 of the Code Napoleon, we have directed our investigation to the construction of the Article which has prevailed under that system. Our researches have
led us to the conclusion that, where both the parties to a marriage, subsequently
declared null, were in good faith, one of the civil effects was the legal community or partnership of acquets and gains which results from a lawful marriage; and that the relative rights of the parties must be tested under the same
laws which govern the community rights inter sese of lawfully married spouses."
The same views are expressed by Duranton (2 DROIT FRANgAIs, 344, § 368)
and by Laurent (2 DRoIT Civim, 646, § 5io).

NOTES

In Texas, however, a different problem is presented. Influenced,
evidently, by the principles of the law of Texas before the common
law was introduced, the judges in this state always displayed a favor
toward the Spanish law on the question at hand. Thus, in an early
case,1 2 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court said by way of dictum:
"I have not considered the strong claim which the defendant,
independently of her rights as lawful wife, might have urged to a
community share of the property. She was his wife de facto.
By her labors and toils, she contributed to the accumulation of
the estate. . . . Their gains were the result of their joint
industry, thrift and economy, and she is reasonably entitled to a
share of the proceeds."
This decision involved a distribution of the estate of a decedent under
the community property laws. The marrage was lawful. This case
and the language were considered in the later case of Routh v.
Routh,2 where the problem again was the distribution of an estate
under the community property laws. In this case the plaintiff was the
lawful, undivorced wife of the decedent. The latter had contracted
a second marriage with the defendant, who was unaware of the impediment. In holding that the applicant was entitled to share in the
property, because she was the lawful wife of the decedent, the court
said:
"The answer showing the second marriage . . . raised
no equities against the plaintiff, nor did it establish, as against
her, any legal right which could be asserted by the second wife
against her."
The defendant had contended that she was entitled to share also,
which would have diminished the lawful wife's share. In short,
under the common law, community property statutes confer no rights
upon an invalid marriage. The exact significance of this decision was
brushed aside by the intermediate Court of Civil Appeals, in the same
state, in a later case, in which it was decreed that the putative wife is
entitled to a "community interest" in the property jointly acquired
during the time the woman lives with the man as his wife, and this
interest can be asserted against the lawful wife. 4 This doctrine was
later affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas.' 5 In affirming the
doctrine, the court frankly admitted that the rule in common law
jurisdictions is contrary, but insisted that by virtue of the community
property laws, the common law rule was abrogated.
v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731, 742 (,858).
57 Tex. 589 (1882).
"Morgan v. Morgan, i Tex. App. 315, 21 S. W. 154 (1892).
'Carroll
1

'Barkley

v. Dumke, supra note 6.
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That community property laws do away with the necessity of a

valid marriage in creating community property rights has been denied
16

by authority,

and by opinion.'1

The reasoning seems to be that

community property statutes are in derogation of the common law,
and should therefore be strictly construed.-8 The sole object of the
statutes is to create equality between the husband and wife as to property rights, 9 and unless the statutes specifically provide that community interests follow a void marriage, the common law necessity for a
valid marriage ought still to obtain. There is no intimation in'the
cases that the community property statutes do so provide.2 0
But, on
the other hand, it is true that the community property laws in the
American states are derived from the laws of Spain.2 ' Attracted by
the theory of these statutes, the courts in other states where they
obtained, applied it to the situation of the putative wife, thus accomplishing what was evolved in Texas from an erroneous dictum, and
what required a specific statute in Louisiana. For this result, Texas
cases were relied on, the courts either ignoring or being unaware of
the background of those cases, or invoking an "analogy" to community
property statutes.22
This is, in effect, to destroy the principle that
rights as spouse are dependent on a valid marriage without statutory aid.
An attempt has been made to show, in this review of the authori"6Chapman v. Chapman, ii Tex. Civ. App. 392, 32 S. W. 564 (1895) ; In re
Sloane, 50 Wash. 86, 96 Pac. 684 (19o8). See also Coats v. Coats, I6o Cal. 671,
118 Pac. 441 (1911). In Routh v. Routh, supra note 13 at 594, it was said:
"The above-stated simple and inexorable rule as to the duration and continuance
of the marriage relation is the doctrine and principle of the common law, which
is the law which governs in this state in determining the nature and effect of a
contract of marriage. There are several decisions of our supreme court which
have determined conjugal and matrimonial rights of parties which had their
origin under the Spanish law, which gave, under the rules and limitations prescribed by it, effect to a second and putative marriage, whilst the partners in
the first were still alive and the marriage between them undissolved .
..
But the laws under which such cases have been determined cannot be invoked,
nor can those decisions furnish reason or authority to ascertain the effect of a
putative marriage under a system of law which recognizes but one valid and
subsisting marriage to continue and endure until death, or until it is dissolved
by judicial decree."
I1See (1923) I TEX. L. REv. 469.
'Hersberger v. Blewett, 46 Fed. 704 (C. C. Wash. I89I); Van Maren
v. Johnson, I5 Cal. 308 (I86O) ; Beals v. Ares, 25 N. M. 459, I85 Pac. 780
(1919).

" Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247 (1859); Hall v. Hall, 41 Wash. I86, 83
Pac. lo8 (19o).
2"See, for example, Schneider v. Schneider and Knoll v. Knoll, both supra
note 6.
' Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525 (1861); Spreckels v. Spreckels, I16
Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897); Strong v. Eakin, ii N. M. 107, 66 Pac. 539
(I9O0).

' See Coats v. Coats, supra note 16, which case was the forerunner of
Schneider v. Schneider, supra note 6.

NOTES
ties, that the relief granted by the courts, even in the community
property states, with the exception of Louisiana, cannot properly be
based upon the community property statutes. This is, in fact, conceded by reliance on "analogies." The question is thus refined to
whether there exist in the rules of equity jurisprudence any principles
which can be applied to justify the decisions which are contrary to
the Ah Leong case. The classification made at the beginning of the
discussion can now be discarded, and all the jurisdictions, excepting
again Louisiana, may be dealt with as common law jurisdictions. The
courts adopting the "putative wife" doctrine have searched for supporting reasons beyond analogies to community property laws. In
this regard it has been said:
"In such cases, by attempting to enter into the marriage contract, they agreed, as far as they had the power to agree, that
they would live together as husband and wife, and that all the
property that they might thereafter acquire should be community
property and belong to them in equal portions. Such is the meaning of the contract they attempted to make under our law. How,
then, can it be said that the property acquired in pursuance of
such shall belong to one of the parties more than to the other ?" 23
In the first place, community property rights do not result from the
contract,2 4 and hence do not depend upon the intention of the parties.
Those rights are superimposed upon the marriage solely by statutory
enactment, 25 they being merely a statutory incident to a lawful status.
If the author of the excerpt above quoted meant that the rights given
the putative wife resulted from the contract entered into, it seems pertinent to inquire just how any contract was formed when by hypothesis the whole relation was void ab initio?
Another ground for the conclusion has been sought in the theory
2
of partnership or quasi-partnership. 26 In Krauter v. Krauter 7
McNeill, J, said:
"What as a matter of right and of equity would become of
this property that was jointly accumulated by the parties? Would
a court of equity decree it to be the property of one to the exclusion of the other? We do not think so, and while it may be true
that the relation between the parties could not strictly be termed
a partnership, but [sic] it might be termed a quasi-partnership."
Morgan v. Morgan, supra note 14.
" 2Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900) ; Ft.
Worth, etc., Co. v. Robertson, 1o3 Tex. 504, 121 S. W. 202 (1910).
'Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U. S. 550 (1892); Howard v. Zeyer, 18 La.
Ann. 407 (1866). And see i TE:X. L. REv., supra note 17.
' Werner v. Werner, Krauter v. Krauter, both supra note 6;. Buckley v.
Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. lO79 (19o8).
" Supra note 6.
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It is hardly susceptible of argument that there is no partnership agreement, either express or implied. Certainly there is no such relationship according to the common law conceptioh of marriage. Moreover, were the division of the property made on this basis, it seems
as though some regard ought to be had to the respective contributions
of the spouses, their extravagance or economy, and other equally important factors in the division of partnership assets. Still the courts
seem to direct no attention to this consideration, and divide the property equally.28
It has been suggested that the distribution of the property acquired during the cohabitation should be decreed on a quasi-contractual
basis, on the theory that the results of the labors of the putative wife
contribute to the acquisition of the property. 29 On this point, it is of
primary importance to keep in mind that it is a distribution of the
property which is being sought. In the ordinary case of husband and
wife, such a theory would not seem to create any purely equitable
interest in the property which the husband accumulates, because the
extent of the wife's labors would be confined to household duties and
services. If anything, the theory might give rise to a legal claim
against the husband or his estate, yet this has been denied by most of
the authorities.3 0
The final ground for decreeing a distribution of the property is
the inherent justice of the putative wife's claim. Let us see first if
the innocent woman is utterly without remedy at the common law.
If, by fraud and deceit, a man who is incompetent to marry induces a
woman to marry and cohabit with him, he is liable to her in a tort
action for deceit, if she acted in good faith. 81 Moreover, if the putative husband takes possession of, and enjoys the benefits of, or disposes of the property of the supposed wife, she, having acted in good
These remedies somefaith, may compel him to account therefor."
what mollify the injustice, if there be any. But is the mere justice
or injustice of a particular case enough to give equity jurisdiction?
" Schneider v. Schneider, Krauter v. Krauter, Werner v. Werner, Knoll v.
Knoll, all supra note 6.
' "The rights of the putative wife are, in my opinion, correctly made to
rest upon the recognition in equity of the results of her labor as contributing to
the acquisition of the property." Judge Tarlton in his lectures at the University of Texas. See i TEX. L. REv., supra note 17 at 471.
" Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397, 32 Atl. 948 (895) ; Murchison v. Green,
128 Ga. 339, 57 S. E. 709 (19o7); McDonald v. Flemming, 12 B. Mon. 285
(Ky. 1851) ; Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888) ; Cropsey v.
Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310 (N. Y. 1858). But see Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 493

(1845).

,I

o

"Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434 (1868) ; Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. I, 33
Atl. 829 (895), and note, 33 L. R. A. 411 (1897).
"McDonald v. Flemming, supra note 30; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 79 Wis. 303,
48 N. W. 26o (18gi). See also, Schmidt v. Schneider, iog Ga. 628, 35 S. E.
145 (1899); Kriger v. Day, 2 Pick. 316 (Mass. 1824); Lawson v. Shotwell,
27

Miss. 630 (854).

NOTES
In answering this question, the words of Lord Redesdale 33 are appropriate:
"There are certain principles on which courts of equity act
which are very well settled. The cases which occur are various,
but they are decided on fixed principles. Courts of equity have,
in this respect, no more discretionary power than courts of law.
They decide new cases as they arise by the principles on which
former cases have been decided; but the principles are as fixed
and certain as the principles on which the courts of common law
proceed."
There was a time in the early history of equity when it was thought
that the conscience of the chancellor was the only guide and that whatever seemed to him to be just might be accomplished by his decree.
The danger of this conception of equity soon became apparent. Different chancellors had different ideas of justice-which of course left
equity without any chart or compass by which to steer its course. As
a result, the original conception was abandoned and definite rules and
principles were substituted for the indefinite conscience of the chancellor. There seems to be no principle in the rules of equity propounded by the courts of this country or England which justifies the
cases opposed to the Ah Leong case. Certainly one would not expect
to find such a principle under the common law idea of the marriage
relation, and, as pointed out before, even the courts which have
granted a division to the putative wife have frankly stated that it
would not do to look to the common law jurisdictions for any supporting rules.8 4 Therefore the entire doctrine of the right of a putative
wife to have a distribution of the property accumulated during the
cohabitation seems to rest upon a judicial adoption of the laws of
Spain and Mexico on the point. If a court of equity has power to
absorb, by its own ipse dixit, the principles of any other body of law,
when it deems the rules of the common law or equity defective, it is
a reversion to the state where the indefinite conscience of the chancellor is the only guide for equity jurisprudence. If that were a sound
proposition, there would be little need for legislatures in a reformation
of the harshness of the common law. Such a reversion is particularly
dangerous where the devolution of property is concerned, as it is here.
The conclusion is, therefore, that the decision in the Ah Leong case
is sound,85 and that any interference with the laws of devolution and
descent, regardless of the justice or injustice in the eyes of the chancellor, must come from the legislature.
J.A.G.
' Bond v. Hopkins, i Sch. & L. 412, 428 (Eng. 18o2).
" See, for example, Morgan v. Morgan, supra note 14.
"Accord: Schmitt v. Schneider, supra note 32.
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DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION UNDER THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE-A recent decision I by Chief Justice Cardozo

justifies a study of certain basic principles underlying a proper under-

standing of that provision of the Constitution of the United States
which declares that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 2
That provision has received two different constructions, (I) that
the privileges and immunities comprehended therein are those which
are in their nature fundamental and inherent in all free governments.

3
This is the older view which found expression in Corfield v. Coryell.
(2) The other view, which is probably the one commonly accepted
today, is that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of one state
to be enjoyed by him in another are only such as are enjoyed in the
second state by its own citizens. In other words, under this latter
view, the purpose of the clause under consideration is conceived to be
the removal from citizens of one state of the disabilities of alienage
in the several states, so that discriminatory legislation aimed by a state
4
against the citizens of other states is the evil sought to be prevented.
Smith v. Loughnun I is an example of the kind of discriminatory
state legislation that has been declared unconstitutional under the provision in question. The New York State Tax Law imposed a tax
upon transfers by will or intestate succession and provided one scheme
6
of taxation of transfers by residents, and another for non-residents.
The transfer tax, when applied to resident decedents, was subject to
certain deductions and exemptions, and there were gradations of the
amount of the tax dependent both upon the amount of the estate and
the relationship between the decedent and the donee. There were no

Smith v. Loughman, 245 N. Y. 486, 157 N. E. 753 (1927).

2 Art. IV, § 2.

Wash. C. C. 371, 380 (C. C. Pa. 1825).
'"It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each state upon the same footing with citizens of other states, so far as
the advantages resulting from citizenship in those states are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other states; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other states; it gives them the right of free
ingress into other states, and egress from them; it insures to them in other
states the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those states in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures
to them in other states the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly
said that no provision of the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute
the citizens of the United States one people as this." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
168, 18o (1868).
For a discussion of this subject see Howell, The Privileges
and Immunities of State Citizenship, (1918) 36 JoHNs HoPxINs UNIv. STUDIES
No. 3; Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens it the Several
States, (19o3) I Micii. L. REV. 286, 364.
'Supra note I.
'The rates were the same for both residents and non-residents until 1925,
when the special rates for the latter were adopted. N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS
(Supp. 1926) c. 61, Art. io-A. Similar statutes have been adopted in California,
Connecticut, Kentucky and Virginia.
34

NOTES
similar provisions relative to the property of non-resident decedents
passing in the same manner. The tax in such a case was to be at a
flat rate of three per cent. upon the clear market value of the property
or interest transferred, less deductions therefrom for a proportionate
share of the debts and expenses of administration, or, at the option of
the executor or administrator, at a flat rate of two per cent. if he
waived such deductions.
One Mary Smith, a resident of the state of Connecticut, devised
to her children a parcel of real estate in the city of New York. Since
the testatrix was a non-resident of the state of New York, the State
Tax Commission assessed a tax of $589.98 on the transfer of these
sbares.7 If the testatrix had been a resident of New York, the tax
would only have been $94.90.
The New York Court of Appeals held that this discrimination
could not be reconciled with the "privileges and immunities" clause,
reversed the order of the Appellate Division of the State Supreme
Court, and annulled the determination of the State Tax Commission.
Chief Justice Cardozo declared that there was "a hostile discrimination," an "inequality that is purposed and pervasive," and found that
by the Tax Law, "an act that in any case is one and the same-the
transfer of a parcel of real estate by will-is subjected to burdens of
taxation that differ fundamentally, and not occasionally or in points
of detail, according as the doer of the act is a citizen of one State or
another." 8
It is to be observed that in form the distinction made by the New
York statute is between residents and non-residents, whereas Article

IV, Section 2, speaks of citizens, "but a general taxing scheme such
as the one under consideration, if it discriminates against all non-

residents, has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination
those who are citizens of other states," 9 and will stand or fall accordingly.
The principle, which is enunciated by this case and others, that a
state may not establish varying codes of law, one for its own citizens,
and another, governing the same conduct, for citizens of sister states,
is more easily stated than applied. The many qualifications to the
rule make the "privileges and immunities" clause difficult of application, because they leave no precise test.
Thus it is said that "one may not press this principle to a drily
"The executrix elected to pay the flat rate of two per cent.
a245 N. Y. at 493, 157 N. E. at 755. The court reversed Smith v. Loughman, 22o App. Div. 790, 222 N. Y. S. 902 (1927), which upheld the statute on
the authority of People v. Loughman, 22o App. Div. 549, 222 N. Y. S. 96
In the latter case the court held that the discrimination imposed by
(1927).
the statute was only apparent since the practical result of the statute, in its
general effect, was not, and was not intended to be, unreasonably or unfairly
discriminatory against non-residents. The court emphasized the fact that the
statute achieved a much desired result in simplifying procedure and proof, in
avoiding delay, and in lessening the expense to all parties involved.
'Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 6o, 79 (1920).
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and that "literal and precise equality in respect to

this matter is not attainable; it is not required.

.

.

.

At times, the

character of the act may be so affected by the residence of the actor
as to call for varying regulation with a view to the attainment in the
end of a truer level of equality." 11 For example, non-residents resorting to the courts of a state may be compelled to give security for
costs. 2 Such a result is regarded only as an apparent discrimination
which as a practical matter does not place a heavier burden upon the
non-resident but restores the "equilibrium by withdrawing an unfair
advantage," and therefore is not such a discrimination as to be declared violative of Article IV, Section 2.
In one case non-resident stockholders in a Connecticut corporation
paid a heavier tax than resident stockholders. 18 Here again the inequality was declared to be only apparent because residents were
taxed in other ways. In another case it was claimed that to apply
the apportionment formula fixed by the inheritance tax statutes of
New Jersey would result in a greater burden on non-residents than
on residents, but the Supreme Court of the United States held the
statute valid, saying: "Inequalities that result not from hostile discrimination, but occasionally and incidentally in the application of a
" Smith v. Loughman, 245 N. Y. at 493, 157 N. E. at 755. This thought
was expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 2I9
U. S. io4, iio (ipIo), a case which involved the Fourteenth Amendment.
11245 N. Y. at 493, 494, 157 N. E. at 755, 756.

In
'See Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (920).
this case the court upheld a Minnesota statute which provided that "when a
cause of action has arisen outside of this state and, by the laws of the place
where it arose, an action is barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be
maintained in this state unless the plaintiff be a citizen of the state who has
owned the cause of action since it accrued." The plaintiff, a citizen of South
Dakota, was denied the benefit of the Minnesota statutory period although his
action was barred under the Canadian statute of limitations where the action
the constitutional requirement is satarose. The court said, at 562: ". .
isfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the state upon terms
which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of any rights
he may have, even though they may not Se technically and precisely the same in
extent as those accorded to resident citizens. The power is in the courts, ultimately in this court, to determine the adequacy and reasonableness of such
terms. A man cannot be said to be denied, in a constitutional or in any rational
sense, the privilege of resorting to courts to enforce his rights when he is given
free access to them for a length of time reasonably sufficient to enable an
ordinarily diligent man to institute proceedings for their protection."
'Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Conn., z85 U. S. 364 (1902). In Chalker v.
Birmingham & N. W. Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 526 (i919), the court held as
discriminatory and unconstitutional a Tennessee statute which imposed a tax
of $25 for the privilege of doing railroad construction work if the chief office
of the company was in the state, and $ioo if it was not. The court expressed itself as follows: "The power of a state to make reasonable and natural classifi-

cations for purposes of taxation is clear and not questioned; but neither under
form of classification nor otherwise can any state enforce taxing laws which in
their practical operation materially abridge or impair the equality of commercial privileges secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of the several
states."

NOTES

system that is not arbitrary in its classification, are not sufficient to
defeat the law." 14
In Shaffer v. Carter"- the Oklahoma income tax statute permitted residents to deduct from their gross income all losses. Nonresidents could deduct only those losses incurred within the state.
The complaint of discrimination was dismissed by pointing out that
residents were taxed on all their income while non-residents were only
taxed on property owned and business carried on within the state.
"In these and like cases," says Chief Justice Cardozo, "the difference in treatment, whatever it may have been, was made necessary by
conditions inseparably interwoven with differences of residence, and
was proportioned to the necessity. Only for this was it upheld." "
It is therefore quite obvious that the courts exercise a wide discretion in determining whether there is a general and hostile discrimination incompatible with the "privileges and immunities" clause, or
whether there is a mere "apparent" discrimination which may be upheld though "occasionally and incidentally" individuals may suffer.
Whether a given statute uses its discrimination to 'establish measure
and proportion, its discords as a means to harmony, is necessarily a
question of opinion. No precise and inflexible rule which will apply
with unerring exactitude in this class of cases is possible.
To recur for a moment to Smith v. Loughman, it is interesting
to observe that although the New York statute in that case imposed
a heavier burden on the non-resident, yet in some instances, because
of the graduated tax applicable to residents, it actually placed a lower
burden on the non-residents than on the residents 17 "The nonresident suffers in the intimate and lower schedules and gains in the
remote and upper ones." Of this result the court said: 's
14
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 543 (I19). See (1920) 29 YALv_
L. J. 464.
252 U. S. 37 (920).
But in Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra
note 9,a New York income tax statute was held to be unconstitutional under
the "privileges and immunities" clause because it allowed exemptions to residents with increases for married persons and dependents but allowed no equivalent exemptions to non-residents. See (1920) 29 YAiL L. J. 799, (1920) 20
CoL. L. REV. 457.
16245 N. Y. at 494, 157 N. E. at 756.
'"For illustration, the tax on a legacy of $5,ooo to a father, mother, husband, wife or child is $IOO for a non-resident, and for a resident nothing; on a

legacy of $10,000, $200 for a non-resident, and for a resident $50; on one of

$5o,ooo, $1,OOO for a non-resident and for a resident $65o; on one of $Iooooo,
$2,ooo for a non-resident and $1,650 for a resident; on one of $250,000, $4,000
for a non-resident, and $4,6oo for a resident. On the other hand, the tax on a
legacy of $5oo to a friend is $Iofor a non-resident, and nothing for a resident;
on one of $IO,OOO, $2oo for a non-resident and $500 for a resident; on one of
$ioo,ooo, $2,00 for a non-resident, and for a resident $5,750."

245 N. Y. at 492, 157 N. E. at 755. The court further said: "A special
burden laid upon the members of a group as the price of a given act does not
cease to ne discrimination because a special privilege is granted in connection
with another and unrelated act. One who wishes to do the first may never
wish to do the second."
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"Whether these inequalities will balance one another in the
long run as applied to non-residents generally, we can do little
more than guess. What is certain is that the inequalities will not
balance, but will inevitably persist, whenever certain classes of
non-residents-e. g., children or parents-are compared with like
classes of residents. What is also certain is that non-residence
without more has been made the basis for the divergent burdens
of one class and another.

.

.

.

The exactions for the two

classes have different operation as to each, not by accident, but of
set purpose. At times heavier and at times lighter, they are never
the same." 19
N.L.E.

"CONFLICT" OF STATUTES OF LIIiTATIONS IN ACTIONS FOR THIE
RECOVERY OF LAND FRAUDULENTLY ACQUIiRED--Western codes have
two groups of statutes of limitations. One group comprises actions
for the recovery of real property; the other, civil actions other than
for the recovery of real property. Situations arise in which it is difficult to ascertain which sort of statute should be applied. If the length
of time which has elapsed since the plaintiff's cause of action has
accrued is greater than that of the short-term statute, and less than
that of the long-term statute, upon the determination of which statute
applies will hinge the success or failure of the action. This precise
question was raised in a recent Oklahoma case, Tomlin v. Roberts.'
The plaintiff brought an action to recover land which was based upon
the cancellation of conveyances declared to be procured by fraud. It
was held that the cause was barred by a two-year statute affecting
actions "for relief on the ground of fraud," a subdivision of the code
provision affecting "civil actions other than for the recovery of real
""It must be constantly borne in mind . . . that the privileges and
immunities spoken of as secured to the citizens of the -several states are not
absolutely secured. In thus referring to them, it is meant simply that, with
regard to the exercise of such privileges and immunities, the several states cannot constitutionally discriminate in favor of their own citizens as against the
citizens of other states; whereas, in respect to certain classes of privileges that
are not secured by the clause, the states are at full liberty to discriminate as they
see fit. In general it may be said that such discriminatory legislation on the
part of any state is permissible in the following cases: (i) with respect to the
exercise of public rights, such as the enjoyment of political and quasi-political
privileges and the utilization of property in which the state has a proprietary
interest; (2) in the legitimate exercise by a state of its police power; (3) with
respect to corporations of other states. The rights which the citizens of each
state are entitled to share upon equal terms with the citizens of other states
are, generally speaking, private or civil, as opposed to public rights; but with
respect to these also there are certain limitations to the extent to which equality
of treatment may be demanded." Howell, The Privileges and Immunities of
State Citizenship, supra note 4 at 320.
1258 Pac. lO41 (1927).

NOTES

property." 2 Two judges, dissenting, contended that a fifteen-year
statute, controlling "actions for the recovery of real property, or for
the determination of any adverse right or interest therein," 3 should
have been applied. The theory of the majority was that the suit was
merely an equitable action for rescission. The minority considered
that the nature of the action was determined by its ultimate purpose,
the recovery of the land.
The opposing views of the members of the court in the principal
case are embodied in other conflicting decisions. 4 The leading case is
Murphy v. Crowley.5 The plaintiff, suing in equity, claimed the defendant procured conveyances by fraud from the grantor who had
since died. The court said:
"This is really an action for the recovery of real estate, and
the plaintiff is no worse off because the fraud was committed on
him, nor the defendant in any better situation, than if the latter
had innocently bought and entered upon an imperfect title."
Citing other California cases, the court observes:
"It seems to be established by these cases that, although the
main ground of the action is fraud or mistake, whereby the
defendant has obtained the legal title to the land in controversy,
and the chief contention between the parties is with respect to the
fraud or mistake alleged, yet, if the plaintiff alleges facts which
show as matter of law that he is entitled to the possession of the
property and a part of the relief asked is that his title to the land
be quieted, the action is in reality for the recovery of real property and is not barred except by the five years' limitation."
In an earlier California case, 6 where a statute provided "Actions
other than those for the recovery of real property can be commenced
as follows . . . fraud, within three years," the court said:
"We think that this provision has no relation to an equitable
proceeding to set aside a fraudulent deed of real estate when the
effect of it is to restore the possession of the premises to the
defrauded party. In such a case the action is substantially an
action for the recovery of real estate; indeed it is literally."
2

OxU.A. COMP. STAT. (1921)
'OLA. COMP. STAT. (1921)

§ 185.
§ 183.

"In accord with the principal case are Melchers v. Peters, 17 Ohio App. i
Foy v. Greenwade, iii Kan. III, 206 Pac. 232 (1922); McMillan v.
Cheeney, 3o Minn. 5,9, 16 N. W. 404 (1883); Morgan v. Morgan, io Wash.
99, 38 Pac. 1054 (1894). Contra: Murphy v. Crowley, 140 Cal. 14, 73 Pac.
82o (19o3) ; Empire Ranch and Cattle Co. v. Zehr, 54 Colo. i85, 129 Pac. 828
(913); Tilton v. Bader, i8r Iowa 473, 164 N. W. 871 (1917); Names v.
Names, 48 Neb. 701, 67 N. W. 75, (1896). See (1926) i WAs H. L. REv. 212.
' Supra note 4.
'City of Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal. 540, 552 (1859).
(192o) ;
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And in an Iowa case:

7

"The mere fact that a litigant alleges and must prove fraud
in order to establish his title does not render the action othe: than
one for the recovery of real property."
The gist of the cause of action in such a case is that the complainant claims the property and prays that the title thereto be established
in him. The allegation and evidence of fraud are merely incidental to
the relief granted.
On the other hand, in a similar action the court said: 8
"The action must be classed as one for relief upon the
ground of fraud.

.

.

.

The action cannot be classed as one

to recover real estate within the ten years limitation statute,
although the result might be in case of a favorable termination of
it for the plaintiff to restore to her a portion of the lands quitclaimed to the defendant. To do this she must have the deed
which she executed set asideand for this purpose it is necessary
to show that it was fraudulently obtained from her. The alleged
fraud of the defendant is the basis of the plaintiff's action . . .
Land] . . . we are bound to hold under the authorities that
the three years limitation applies to this case. The fact that it

might result in the recovery of real property is not sufficient to
except it therefrom."
The Kansas court in holding that the shorter limitation applies
remarked:
"An action to recover property has no standing until the
matter of title is disposed of." '
The court noted that it was essential to look behind the mere form of
the action to the real issue involved. By doing this it finds that the
substance of the action is for relief on the ground of fraud.
So the Minnesota court said: "o
"The cross action which the defendants have in effect instituted by their answer, while as respects its ultimate purpose, it
is an action for the recovery of real property, is an action in
which the recovery is sought as a consequence of relief upon the
ground of fraud. Unless relieved from the fraud, the defendants will have no standing to recover the property, as without this
relief the legal title will remain in the plaintiff. .

.

.

The

gist and essence of the cross action is, then, relief from the fraud
'Tilton v. Bader, supra note 4.
'Morgan v. Morgan, supra note 4 at lO7.
'Foy v. Greenwood, supra note 4 at 119.
0 McMillan v. Cheeney, supra note 4 at 521.
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and fraudulent conveyances (by means of which the plaintiff
acquired his title) so as to put the defendant in a position to
recover the property. The cross action is then essentially one for
relief on the ground of fraud."
From this brief survey, it is clear that in the code states the courts
differ as to the basis for the application of the various limitations
statutes. Some think the form of action determines which statute
should be applied, while others think that the nature of the ultimate
relief sought should be the determinant. There appears to be, however, another possible solution of the problem.
When an action is brought to recover land, and the plaintiff is
forced first to seek the aid of the court to cancel or set aside deeds in
order to establish his right to the property, the appeal is necessarily
to the equitable jurisdiction of the court. Pomeroy says: ""There are certain species of equitable remedies which have
become well established and familiarly known, and which are
commonly designated by the term "equitable remedies" . .
A familiar example is the relief of rescission and cancellation. A
court of equity entertains a suit for the express purpose of procuring a contract or conveyance to be cancelled, and renders a
decree conferring in terms that exact relief."
Statutes of limitations are not binding on courts of equity in
cases of essentially equitable jurisdiction, and the lapse of time, however long, where there is reasonable excuse for the delay, will not
deprive a party of his remedy.1 2 Therefore, the courts would seem
to be free to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to cases of rescission and cancellation, and to withhold relief only when the parties
have slept on their rights. Since the abolition of forms of actions in
code states has not altered the substantive rights of the parties, nor
changed the fundamental principles of law and equity," no objection
can be seen to the substitution of the doctrine of laches for the inflexible statute of limitations.
J.B.
i PomERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. i918) § iio.
WooD, LiMITATIONs (4th ed. 1916) 59; Mathieson v. Craven, 228 Fed.

21

345, 377 (D.C. Del. i915) ; Sicher v. Rawbousek, 193 Mo. 113, 129 (1go5);
Oregon v. Warner Valley Stock Co., 56 Ore. 283, io6 Pac. 780 (1gIo).
' De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 463 (1852) ; Young v. Vail, 29 N. M. 324, 222
Pac. 912 (1924) ; Cole v. Reynolds,. 18 N. Y. 74 (858) ; Draper v. Brown, 115
Wis. 361, 91 N. W. ooI (19o2).

